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POINT I
THE
INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION
ACTED
CAPRICIOUSLY IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
PREEXISTING CONDITION.

ARBITRARILY AND
DECEDENT HAD NO

It is Appellant Workers1 Compensation Fund of Utah's position
that the

Industrial

capriciously

in

Commission

concluding

of

that

Utah
Mr.

acted
Dale

arbitrarily and
Steward

preexisting condition predisposing him to heart failure.
it is

the Fund's

indicates that

contention that

Mr.

Steward

had

had

no

That is,

evidence in the record clearly
a

preexisting

condition which

substantially increased his risk of sustaining a heart attack.
At page

8 of

Respondent's Brief,

it is

decedent had no pre-existing heart condition
conditions and

set forth that the

or other preexisting

therefore the "any exertion" standard of Allen may

be used to establish legal causation.
[T]he Administrative Law Judge in this matter found that
the decedent, Dale Steward, had no "previously diagnosed
heart condition." This finding is not controverted in
any of the evidence before the Commission. The Fund
refers to various "risk" factors but the fact remains
that Mr. Steward had never previously been diagnosed as

having heart problems and no medical examination before
or after his death indicated the presence of preexisting
heart disease.
While

Respondent

Steward was
this

is

relies

never previously

not

preexisting

fatal

to

condition.

heavily

upon

the

fact

that Mr.

diagnosed as having heart problems,

Appellant's
As

set

claim

that

there

was

a

forth in Appellant's principal

brief, the preexisting condition of which Allen speaks need not be
patent

nor

"previously

diagnosed."

See

concurring opinion in Holloway v. Industrial

Justice

Zimmerman's

Commission# 729 P.2d

31, 32 (Utah 1986) wherein it is stated:
With respect to the focus of this case on remand-whether
Holloway had a preexisting condition-I would observe
that the preexisting condition of which Allen speaks
need not be patent; in fact, it need not have been known
or knowable to anyone before the injury. The sole
question is whether the worker came to the work place
with a condition that increased his risk of injury. If
he did and that condition contributed to the injury,
then Allen's higher standard of legal causation comes
into play so as to place that worker on the same footing
as one who did not come to work with a preexisting
condition, (emphasis added)
It is Appellant Fund's
indicates

that

Mr.

contention

Steward

did

in

that
fact

the

record clearly

have

a

preexisting

condition which increased his risk of injury.
As indicated in Appellant's principal brief,
1985, Dr.

Peter Heilbrun

set forth,

wonder if some of [Dale Steward's]
was possibly

myocardial in

on November 18,

"In retrospect, it makes me

recent neck

and shoulder pain

origin." (Appellants Principal Brief;

R.135)
Respondent maintains
"appears

to

have

been

that

this

simply

a

2

statement
question,

by
[and

Dr. Heilbrun
that]

other

evidence from Dr. Heilbrun adequately supports the finding
Administrative

Law

Judge."

Respondent Steward then cites
dated July

25, 1986

to

be

a letter

Brief

written by

page

8)

Dr. Heilbrun,

wherein it is stated that "[Mr. Steward] had

no prior history of cardiac
considered

(Respondent's

of the

an

disease,

thus

his

industrial-related

death

[sic]

should be

cardiac event."

(Respondent's Brief page 9)
It is the Fund's belief that Dr. Heilbrun1s statement amounts
to much

more than

"simply a

question."

Rather, it rises to the

level of being a calculated opinion that very possibly Mr. Steward
had

a

preexisting

opinion was iterated
appears to

heart

condition.

within

one

week

Further, inasmuch as this
of

decedent's

death, it

be much more credible than the July 25, 1986 statement

of Dr. Heilbrun.

This is especially so in light of the

fact that

the July 25, 1986 letter appears to be a statement prepared at the
widow's request and suggestion.
yet

another

letter

to

the

In this light, Dr. Heilbrun wrote

claimant on the same date, July 25,

1986, and stated:
I am enclosing the following letter.
Please read
through it and advise me if you feel it satisfactorily
explains my thoughts on the industrially related nature
of Dale's heart attack. (R.244)
Dr.

Heilbrun's

statement

of

conjunction with the risk factors
discussed

in

Appellants

November

possessed

principal

brief

18,
by
at

the
page

cigarette smoking habit, amphetamine use, emphysema,
well as

1985, taken in
decedent as
8

(36 year

obesity), as

Dr. Perry's statement, clearly show that the decedent had

a preexisting heart condition
3

which

substantially

increased his

risk of injury.

Dr. Perry set forth:

In terms of medical probability it is most likely that
[Dale Steward] experienced a fatal cardiac arrhythmia
while driving, lost consciousness a few seconds later
thus losing control of the vehicle and having the
accident as
reported.
It is possible that his
dextroamphetamine was related to his death because it
may worsen arrhythmias in susceptible [sic] individuals.
(R.lll)
Regarding this statement
states that

"Dr. Perry

preexisting heart

indicate

that

Dr.

made no

disease in

substantial medical
to

by

Respondent Steward

other conclusion

Mr. Steward

evidence before
Mr.

Perry,

Steward

with regard to

and there

was thus no

the Administrative Law Judge
had

any

heart

condition."

that

Dr. Perryfs statement is

(Respondent's Brief page 10)
It

is

the

tantamount

to

condition.

Fund's

position

substantial

medical

evidence

of

a

preexisting

Specifically/ Dr. Perry has impliedly stated that Mr.

Steward had a preexisting heart condition.

This

is evidenced by

Dr.

being

a "susceptible

Perry

referring

individual."

to

Mr.

Steward

Appellant posits

as

that Mr.

Steward was susceptible

because he had a preexisting heart condition.
Accordingly/

inasmuch

as

there

is

a

evidence in the record to support a finding
no preexisting
properly

heart condition/

reflect

the

evidence

lack of substantial
that Mr.

Steward had

this finding must be reversed to
in

the

record

indicating

the

presence of a preexisting condition.
Further/ inasmuch as Mr. Steward had a history of amphetamine
treatment

for

condition that

narcolepsy/

this

increased his
4

also

risk of

was
injury."

a

"...preexisting
Hollowav/ supra.

Thus, because a preexisting condition was brought to the workplace
by Mr. Steward, the unusual exertion

standard of

Allen should be

applied*
POINT II
THE
INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION
ACTED
CAPRICIOUSLY IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
EXPERIENCED UNUSUAL EXERTION.
In
unusual

support

of

exertion

Respondent

her

contention that Mr. Steward experienced

while

states

that

ARBITRARILY AND
DECEDENT STEWARD

undertaking
"the

his

employment

duties,

facts in this proceeding establish

that Mr. Steward experienced exertion greater than that undertaken
in normal everyday life..." (Respondent's Brief at 12)
The Commission

found that

the Administrative

Law Judge was

justified in finding that the decedent was driving under unusually
stressful circumstances due to the fact his departure was delayed,
he had to drive on snow
rest in

between the

Lake City.

covered roads,

trip to

and he

Denver and

had little

or no

the return trip to Salt

(R.287)

As set forth in Appellant's principal brief, it is the Fund's
belief that

these aforementioned industrial factors do not amount

to an exertion greater than that put forth in non-employment life.
Moreover, it

is Appellants

position that

certainly did not "contribute
already
lacking.
risk

faced,

and

the industrial factors

something substantial"

therefore

per

Allen,

legal

From a purely logical standpoint, where

factors

cigarettes a

present

(36

years

day, amphetamine
5

of

smoking,

use, emphysema,

to the risk

causation

is

there are other
1

1/2

packs of

obesity), even in

the absence of the work stress factor, it
one more

that adding

factor (fatigue) is not a substantial contribution so as

to conclude that the work activities
the

would seem

facts

do

not

support

a

caused the

finding

injury.

Because

of unusual exertion, the

finding of legal causation can not stand.
POINT III
THE
INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION
ACTED
ARBITRARILY AND
CAPRICIOUSLY IN CONCLUDING THAT MEDICAL CAUSATION WAS
ESTABLISHED AND BY NOT SUBMITTING THE MEDICAL CAUSATION
ISSUE TO A MEDICAL PANEL.
While it
Brief,

that

is true,
Respondent

fatigued immediately
this

does

not

states

physician,

Dr.

has

prior to

amount

Respondent

as stated by Respondent at page 14 of her

that

Perry,

to

established

that

suffering his

a

showing

"It

is

of

was

Steward was

fatal heart attack,
medical

significant

apparently

Mr.

that

not

causation.
the

Fund's

presented

with

information about the stress and fatigue factors, since nowhere in
his letter
sleep, or

does he

mention Mr.

Steward's schedule,

his lack of

the effects on him of the adverse weather conditions he

experienced while driving to Denver." (Respondents Brief page 14)
Appellcmt
Respondent is

believes

that

this

overly presumptuous.

conclusory

statement

by

That is to say, just because

Dr. Perry did not refer to certain factors certainly does not mean
that the factors were not considered.

Rather, it merely indicates

that Dr. Perry did not believe that industrial stress factors - if
any - played a part in causing Steward's death.
the reason for Dr. Perry not referring to
because

the

police

report
6

indicated

Moreover, perhaps

any adverse

weather is

that the road was dry and

there were no adverse weather conditions. (R.99,100)
Further, in concluding that Stewardfs death was caused by the
stress

conditions

surrounding

his workplace, the Administrative

Law Judge took judicial notice of

a chart

allegedly constituting

"consensus medical opinion that stress, fatigue and stimulants are
all common precipitating causes of cardiac arrhythmia." (R.287)
While Appellants have contended in their principal brief that
it was

error for

the Administrative

notice of the chart

to

establish

Law Judge

medical

to take judicial

causation, Respondent

maintain's that Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence permits her
to do so.
Specificallyf Respondent sets forth as follows:
Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that a
court may take judicial notice of adjudicative facts
"capable of accurate and ready determination by resort
to
sources
whose
accuracy
cannot reasonably be
questioned." (Rule 201)(b)(2)
*

*

*

Although Rule 201 provides a mechanism for the Fund to
be heard with regard to the Administrative Law Judge's
taking of judicial noticef the Fund made no request to
be heard and should not be allowed to complain at this
stage of the proceedings that it could not. object to the
material.
(Respondent's Brief at page 15-16)
It is
taking

the Fund's

judicial

position that

notice

Administrative Law Judge.

of

the

Rule 201 does not encompass

chart

referred

to

by

the

In the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of

Law and Order, Judge Sumsion stated, "The Administrative Law Judge
has not made any extensive research of medical literature relative
to the causes of cardiac arrhythmias.
7

He has reviewed, however, a

commentary

on

cardiac

arrythmia's...n

(R.272)

The commentary

reviewed by the Judge has a copyright date of 1968.
The Fund believes that
cardiac arrythmia's

is a

the

twenty

year

old

commentary on

source whose accuracy can reasonably be

questioned, and therefore, the

chart

does

not

fall

within the

argument

that

the

Fund

should

ambit of Rule 201.
Further,

Respondents

precluded from objecting to the chart

at this

late stage

be

of the

proceedings is misplaced.
The Fund first received notice of Judge Sumsion's reliance on
the chart in his Findings of

Fact, Conclusions

of Law

and Order

which was entered on May 28, 1987.
On June

12, 1987, at its first opportunity, the Fund, in its

Motion for Review, alleged error on the part of Judge

Sumsion for

taking judicial notice of the chart.
In further

support of

its position that judicial notice was

properly taken, Respondent cites the 1921 Utah case
Mining Company

of North Beck

v. Industrial Commission of Utah* 58 Utah 486, 200

P.Ill (1921).
North Beck Mining is clearly distinguishable from the case at
bar.

While the

situation at

hand involves

an internal failure

injury and the highly technical issue concerning the medical cause
of the

internal failure, North Beck was concerned with the degree

of impairment of an employee who had lost use of his hand.

While

medical expertise is required to determine the medical cause of an
internal injury, no such expertise is required to take notice that
8

a miner

who has

lost use

of his hand has incurred a substantial

impairment.
Respondent
disregarded

further

Dr.

states

Heilbrun's

Administrative Law

that

opinion

Judge improperly

reference material,

makes

this

this

determined

took judicial

(Respondents

statement

other sufficient evidence has
causation.

and

if

court

that

the

notice of the

Mrs. Steward has provided sufficient evidence

to establish medical causation."
Respondent

"[e]ven

and

Brief at

page 19)

is then silent as to what

been provided

to establish medical

Appellant is aware of no such evidence.

Respondent

further

relies

Industrial Commission v. Havensf
distinguishable from

the case

upon

314 P.2d
at bar

strong circumstantial evidence

the

Colorado

698 (1957).

case

of

Havens is

inasmuch as there was very

indicating

a

causal relationship

between the injury to Havens and his work.
Inasmuch as

Mr. Steward

had a preexisting condition as well

as other risk factors, no such circumstantial evidence
in this

matter.

Moreover, in

undisputed whereas in the
disputes such
driving.
Commission

present

facts were completely

situation,

there

are factual

as the weather conditions in which the decedent was

The Fund believes that
v.

Havens the

is present

Hesler,

370

the Colorado
P.2d

428

case of Industrial

(Colo.

representative of the case at bar than is Havens.

1962)

is

In Heslej, the

court set forth as follows:
[1] In fatal "heart" cases the claimant must show that
an accident or overexertion proximately caused the death
of the employee.
In the instant case the record fails
to disclose an accident in the "slip and fall" sense of
9

more

that word/ and for that reason alone is distinguishable
from Industrial Commission of Colorado v. Havens, 136
Colo. lllr 314 P.2d 698/ where deceased suffered a blow
from a handcar/ and Marotte v. State Compensation
Insurance Fund/ 145 Colo, 99r357 P.2d 915f where the
employee suffered a non-fatal heart attack shortly after
an automobile accident.
Being unable to show any such
"accident"/ it devolved upon this claimant to establish
overexertion.
370 P.2d at 431
Finally/
committed by

the
not

medical panel.
as

amended)

Commission

Fund

is

referring

While

refer

the

the

firm

medical

belief that error was
causation

issue

to a

Section 35-1-77/ Utah Cod Annotated (1953/

contains
to

of

discretionary
matters

to

a

language
medical

allowing

the

panel/ Respondents

believe/ as set forth in its principal brief/ that this discretion
was abused.

Moreover/

the Industrial Commission's own Rules and

Regulations indicate that

the

medical

causation

issue

must be

referred to a medical pane. Workers Compensation Rule 1.2.33 sets
forth/ in part/ as follows:

1.2.33
(a)

GUIDELINES FOR UTILIZATION OF MEDICAL PANEL

A panel will be utilized where:
2.

In the opinion of the Commission the
medical issues are so intertwined
with
the
events
that
a
determination of whether an accident
has occurred cannot be made without
first
resolving
medical
consideration, (emphasis added)

Inasmuch as the medical issue of causation herein
tied to

the events

is closely

surrounding the injury/death/ it is necessary

that the issue by submitted to a medical panel.

10

CONCLUSION
Because the findings of
supported

by

the

record/

capricious, and the Order of
overturned and

the
the
the

Industrial
findings
Industrial

compensation benefits denied.

the issue of medical

causation should

Commission
are

and

must be

In the alternative/

be submitted

day of April, 1988.

James R. Black

Kpvijh M. McDonough

11

arbitrary

Commission

panel.
DATED this*

are not

to a medical
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